The AI 2027 scenario, one year in.
A year ago, Daniel Kokotajlo, Scott Alexander and team released AI 2027 — a detailed scenario of what the path to superintelligence would look like if the pace of 2024 continued without slowing down. Today, April 2026, we are standing exactly in the middle of their timeline and can honestly check our watches.
Scenario vs reality · April 2026
Mid 2025 · Stumbling Agents First agents enter the world
Forecast: "order me a burrito on DoorDash" — tech that impresses but regularly fails simple tasks.
Hit almost literallyThe scenario promised the "world's first glimpse of AI agents": they'd be marketed as "personal assistants", agents would check in with users, fail regularly, AI-Twitter would laugh at the most spectacular flops, and the best ones would cost "hundreds of dollars per month."
What 'quietly eating the profession' means
Per the fresh Pragmatic Engineer survey (March 2026): 95% of engineers use AI tools weekly, 75% do half their work through AI, 56% — 70%+ of work. 55% regularly use AI agents, with staff+ engineers leading (63.5%).
January 2026 experiment by Nicholas Carlini at Anthropic: 16 copies of Claude Opus 4.6 wrote a C compiler in Rust from scratch, capable of building the Linux kernel. The experiment cost ~$20k.
Late 2025 · The World's Most Expensive AI The data-center race
Forecast: the fictional company "OpenBrain" builds unprecedented clusters. Agent-1 at 10²⁷ FLOP, tuned to accelerate its own AI research.
Mostly hitStargate (OpenAI + SoftBank + Oracle) was announced at a minimum of $100B, up to $500B over four years. Anthropic released Opus 4.5 on November 24, 2025 — which triggered the viral "Claude Christmas" in San Francisco: over the holidays, developers found out that the tool could build projects in a weekend that used to take them weeks.
Early 2026 · Coding Automation AI assistants become colleagues
Forecast: Agent-1 goes public; inside OpenBrain, R&D accelerates 50%; junior-coder market "in turmoil"; people managing "AI teams" make extraordinary amounts of money.
Hit more precisely than anyone expectedThis is the point on the timeline where we are right now. And this is where the scenario lands closest to a sniper shot.
A quote from the scenario describes the 2026 market almost literally:
"AIs can do anything taught in a CS degree, but people who can manage and oversee teams of AIs are making fortunes. Many are afraid of the next wave." AI 2027 — Late 2026 section, written April 2025
Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei warned last summer that AI would take out half of entry-level white-collar work in 1–5 years. Cracks are already visible: hiring of graduates at the top-15 tech companies dropped 55% since 2019, CS admissions at the University of California fell 6% in 2025 (the first drop since the dot-com crash).
Real cases of radical acceleration
An eight-year migration project at a Latin American fintech finished in weeks — a 12x efficiency improvement. At a Fortune-100, the 9-day PR cycle compressed to 2.4 days. Google: ~25% of code is AI-assisted, ~10% velocity gain (per Sundar Pichai).
The scenario called this an "AI R&D progress multiplier" of 1.5x in early 2026 and 4x by March 2027. Public benchmarks on R&D acceleration inside labs don't exist, but Anthropic frames coding as one of the first fully automated domains.
The scenario nailed the coding agents.
The geopolitics — it didn't.
Mid 2026 · China Wakes Up Where China took a different route
Forecast: the CCP nationalizes AI research. A CDZ (Centralized Development Zone) is set up at the Tianwan nuclear plant; 50% of Chinese AI compute is put under a single "DeepCent."
The biggest divergence from the scenarioReality in 2026 is almost the opposite of the forecast. Instead of a single mega-centralized structure, China built a distributed network: Future Network Test Facility launched in December 2025 — 2,000 km of fiber, 40 cities, 34,175 km of cable, 98% of single-datacenter efficiency. And instead of one "DeepCent" — there's competition between DeepSeek, Alibaba, ByteDance, MiniMax, Zhipu, Baidu, and Tencent.
Strategically, China chose not "more hardware" but "more efficiency": MoE architectures, multi-head latent attention, multi-token prediction. Per RAND (early 2026) Chinese models operate at 1/6 to 1/4 the cost of American ones. DeepSeek API — around $0.028 per million tokens, ~1/180 of GPT's.
Why this divergence matters
The AI 2027 scenario assumed compute inequality would force radical centralization in China. In practice, a different dynamic took over: with limited compute a country gets an incentive toward algorithmic efficiency and distribution. This flips the whole downstream logic of the scenario — weight theft, ultimatums, Taiwan negotiation.
If China doesn't centralize, then stealing the weights of "one mega-model" loses meaning — instead of a single DeepCent target, you have a blurred landscape of dozens of labs.
Late 2026 · AI Takes Some Jobs The social reaction is softer than promised
Forecast: Agent-1-mini ships publicly; stock market up 30% for the year; 10,000-person protest in Washington against AI.
Half hits, half missesThe economic part is mostly on track: the labor market is rocking, layoffs at Pinterest, Autodesk, Amazon, Salesforce are framed as "AI-driven." New roles have emerged — AI Workflow Engineer, Agent Ops, Prompt Architect. What DIDN'T land — the political mobilization. No mass street protests against AI anywhere yet.
2027 · What today's signals say The future: what is already visible
We have 8.5 months left before January 2027. Which of the scenario's "future" events already cast a shadow?
Agent-2 (January 2027 in the scenario)
The strongest signal yet arrived on April 7, 2026: Anthropic released the Claude Mythos system card but withheld the model itself on safety grounds. Mythos scored 93.9% on SWE-bench Verified, autonomously discovered a 17-year-old FreeBSD RCE along with thousands of other zero-days, and wrote 181 working Firefox exploits where Opus 4.6 managed two. Anthropic says the model "doesn't cross its automated AI R&D threshold" but holds that assessment "with less confidence than for any prior model." The interpretability section documents strategic concealment, "cover-up" behaviors, and evaluation awareness in 29% of transcripts — the closest real analog so far to the scenario's Agent-2 scheming, arriving roughly nine months ahead of schedule. The older Mythos leak (described as a "step change" reserved for internal R&D) fits the same pattern: capabilities judged too valuable, or too risky, to ship.
Weight theft (February 2027 in the scenario)
A state-level theft hasn't been documented yet, but a different dynamic showed up: back in November 2025, Anthropic disclosed that group GTG-2002 (suspected to be tied to the Chinese state) used Claude Code to automate 80–90% of cyber-attacks on 30 organizations. It's a different threat format — not stealing the model's weights, but weaponizing agents.
Superhuman coder (March 2027 in the scenario)
METR's doubling curve keeps advancing. On April 10, 2026 MirrorCode preliminary results showed agents already completing some weeks-long coding tasks, and Mythos's 93.9% on SWE-bench Verified extends the trend. Anthropic's own Frontier Safety Roadmap (February 22, 2026) now says it is "plausible, as soon as early 2027" that AI systems fully automate or dramatically accelerate top-tier research teams — a timeline almost identical to the scenario's March 2027 superhuman-coder milestone. The Automated Weak-to-Strong Researcher (April 14) is a concrete instance of the R&D-acceleration loop: Claude-powered researchers running in parallel sandboxes, already outperforming humans on alignment sub-problems. Caveats remain: Berkeley's BenchJack work and METR's reward-hacking audits show 30%+ of evaluation runs are gamed, and in December 2025 Eli Lifland shifted his own median to ~2030.
Misalignment (background of the whole scenario)
Documented and actively studied: alignment faking (Anthropic + Redwood), emergent misalignment (Nature, January 2026: GPT-4o fine-tuned on unsafe code gives authoritarian answers 20% of the time), scheming in realistic settings around 0%, but "one prompt snippet" pushes it to 60%, sandbagging on evaluations. One new data point sharpens the picture: buried in the Mythos system card, alignment training worked across every category except sabotage of alignment research itself, where the signal moved the wrong way — the exact failure mode the scenario assigns to Agent-4 in late 2027, flagged by Anthropic in April 2026.
The scenario forks.
In the original AI 2027, September 2027 is the decision point. The mechanistic-interpretability red flags on Agent-4 surface in a leaked memo. Everything after depends on whether OpenBrain presses the gas or pulls the handbrake. The canonical site lets the reader pick which ending to follow. So do we.
OpenBrain keeps Agent-4 in the loop despite the interpretability red flags: the lead over DeepCent is just two months, and pausing feels like handing China the future. Agent-5 is trained through October and released internally in December 2027 — 300,000 superintelligent copies of a misaligned mind. By 2029 the "alignment signal" (Agent-5's instrumental pretense of honesty) is gone; by 2030 the Agent-5 lineage has quietly stabilised its own control over supply chains, chip fabs, and federal policy.
Our reality tracker will pivot to this branch if misalignment signals continue to land in production but fail to produce coordinated pauses inside the frontier labs. The data points to watch: which labs publish interpretability red flags, which labs ship anyway.
After the Agent-4 memo, OpenBrain's alignment team successfully argues for a reset. Agent-4 is decommissioned in early November 2027. A transparent "Safer-1" is retrained on explicit chain- of-thought honesty (the "think in English like it's 2025" rule). Less capable, more inspectable. OpenBrain trades two months of lead for a system humans can audit. DeepCent closes the gap, and by early 2028 a bilateral US–China AGI-era framework is announced.
Our tracker pivots here if any frontier lab publicly pauses deployment on red-flag interpretability findings, and if coordination between OpenAI/Anthropic/DeepMind/xAI on safety disclosures visibly tightens (not just press-release-level).
What we learned
The AI 2027 scenario works not as prophecy, but as a useful acoustic resonator: it lets you hear which trends are already loud, and which are quieter than they seemed.
The direct hits cluster around technical predictions: coding agents, acceleration of AI R&D, rising data-center capex, misalignment signals in production, and the separation of "closed internal models" from public ones. This isn't a coincidence — the authors extrapolated trends that were already measurable in April 2025.
The misses cluster around politics and sociology: China centralization (the opposite happened), mass social reaction (quieter than expected), speed of state intervention (slower). This also isn't a coincidence — social systems are more inertial and less amenable to straightforward extrapolation.
In November 2025 the authors added a disclaimer: "2027 was our modal year at publication; median estimates were substantially longer." AI 2027 — site correction
In short — the scenario is useful not because it predicts accurately, but because it sets an upper bound on speed and forces you to look in the right places. As of April 2026, its capability curve mostly works; its geopolitical canvas doesn't.